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Accidental Lean - Performance improvement in an NHS 
hospital and reflections on the role of Operations Strategy  
Introduction  
This chapter reviews a management consultancy intervention at a Wing of a Northern 
Hospital (NH) where the consultants were engaged to execute a performance improvement 
project to train the general public how to behave more responsibly in a hospital with regard 
to hospital acquired infections (HAI) such as MRSA1.  The Strategic Health Authority (NHSA) 
commissioned the work because the Northern Hospital (NH) had among the highest rates of 
infection in the region, falling far short of Department of Health targets regarding HAI.  The 
chapter’s contribution to Service Operations Management and the study of healthcare is to 
consider the implications of piecemeal improvement programmes and reflect on whether a 
more studied approach towards operational performance objectives, developing an 
Operations Strategy, might result in behavioural and performance step-change 
improvement. 
The work belongs within an existing body of research on performance improvement in 
Healthcare, much of which discusses the application of tools and techniques deriving from 
the Toyota Production System (TPS) collectively known as Lean (Krafcik 1988).  A brief 
comparison is made between the case and other research before reflecting on service 
delivery and performance within the UK’s National Health Service (NHS).  Consideration is 
given as to whether the use of an Operations Strategy, another manufacturing-derived 
approach, could help the NHS have greater success in achieving its objective of using 
resources to best effect to deliver improved patient care (NHS_Plan 2000).  Typically, an 
operations strategy provides the broader conceptualisation of service  delivery and ‘value’ 
                                                 
1
 MRSA (Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus): a bacterial infection resistant to many widely-used 
antibiotics.  It spreads in crowded environments where there is frequent skin-to-skin contact, making it more 
common in people who are in hospital or nursing homes. 
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creating organisational knowledge and enabling planning to reconcile market requirements 
and resources  (Slack and Lewis 2011).   The purpose of this chapter is to reflect on that 
reconciliation, or its absence, in the NHS in conjunction with the concept of ‘patient value’, a 
key priority area for health policy (Currie et al. 2008) and a driver of the consulting 
intervention described. 
Healthcare is perhaps the most personal and important service people experience.  It is also 
a service people need but do not necessarily want (Berry and Bendapudi 2007).  Patient 
perceptions of safety and care are what make up the ‘patient experience’, something that 
transcends a purely medical perspective.  Unlike other services where demand increases 
supply, in healthcare supply increases demand. More physicians or hospital beds in a given 
region translate into more medical services rendered on a per capita basis without 
necessarily improving the overall health status of that population group (ibid).   
Service quality is an approach to achieving better health outcomes, with both quality and 
value determined by the beneficiary, and has become an important corporate strategy for 
healthcare organizations. Groonroos (2007) suggests there are two distinct components to 
quality, the technical aspect, or what is provided, and the functional aspect, or how the 
service is provided.  It is the functional aspect that patients perceive and receive.  Patient 
satisfaction therefore demands consideration of both the service concept and the customer 
characteristic (Anderson et al. 2008).  
The NHS Context Leading to the Consulting Intervention 
 “Infections are the price we pay for advances in medicine which allow survival in patients 
who are unlikely to have survived their illness a few years ago” (Department of Health 2006). 
At its inception in 1948 it was assumed that quality would be inherent in the service offering 
of the newly formed National Health Service (NHS) through the skills and ethos of the health 
professionals working within the system (Nicholls et al. 2000).  The culture of the 
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organisation has been historically based upon clinical excellence and the assumed 
leadership of clinicians.  Since the introduction of the “internal market”, numerous changes 
have occurred, including those of staff attitudes and perceptions, culture, patient 
expectations, and medical technology (Burgess and Radnor 2012, Graban and Swartz 
2012).   
In the NHS, quality is seen as a “prevailing purpose”, having become a statutory requirement 
in 1997, incorporating the principles of corporate governance and applying these for the first 
time to quality and clinical governance (Cullen et al. 2000).  The NHS Plan (2000) specified 
that funding was linked to modernisation.  Implicit was an acknowledgement that in order to 
deliver the aims of the clinical governance agenda the culture of health care organisations 
needed to be changed (Waring and Bishop 2010, Graban et al. 2012).  A ‘patient-led’ 
perspective does not challenge clinical excellence but suggests a better balance be struck 
between the perceived ‘value’ of clinical safety and care and the perceived ‘value’ of more 
general patient safety and care. 
This has made healthcare a fast-mover in policy reform although change is beset with 
professional and policy constraints, burdened by a mosaic of professions, large-scale 
structural change and the presence of central targets (Currie and Lockett 2011).  Structural 
change in the NHS is framed by an increasingly prescriptive and centrally-driven set of 
performance measures (Currie and Suhomlinova 2006) and makes radical change within a 
culture such as the NHS problematic (Esain et al. 2008, Radnor and Osborne 2013).  
Consequently most initiatives within Hospitals and within the NHS in general tend to follow 
the path of incremental change and improvement rather than breakthrough (Ritchie 2002:4, 
Umble and Umble 2006).  Choosing the tools and deciding the degree of emphasis in order 
to maximise the potential benefits and outputs of an action is difficult.  It requires knowledge 
and planning.   The former is not always easy to harness in a large organisation, and the 
latter, to be done properly, requires time, a sometimes rare commodity (Ritchie 2002:4).   
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A number of consulting projects have been carried out across UK hospitals, conforming in 
the main to Ritchie’s contention, and increasingly choosing the ‘business’ tools of quality and 
continuous improvement such as Kaizen and Lean (Antony et al. 2007, Patwardhan and 
Patwardhan 2008, Boaden 2009;), alongside the adoption of the models of performance 
management (Smith 2002).  Probably the most famous UK example is Gerry Robinson’s 
televised improvement intervention at Rotherham General Hospital in 2006 (Towill 2009).  
Burgess (2012) provides comprehensive coverage of such improvement projects.  Given the 
already stated objective of operations strategy as the conceptualisation of service delivery 
and organisational knowledge so that market needs can be effectively met, consideration of 
the multiple Lean interventions across the NHS raises a number of questions.  The most 
obvious one is why are there so many interventions?  Also, what lessons are learned from 
each one?  How are, or indeed are, these lessons disseminated throughout the NHS?  Are 
they used to encourage systematic learning, performance improvement and consistent 
service delivery, to leave quality deposits, as advocated by Dale et al. (2002)? 
The Operational Context for the Management Consultants at Northern Hospital (NH) 
While professionals and patients may define quality in different ways, Hospital Acquired 
Infections (HAI), especially MRSA have become synonymous in the public eye with poor 
quality service.  Centrally-collated DoH statistics (2006) show that MRSA occurs in the main 
outside hospitals, and in fact people come to hospitals to be cured of it.  As a response, the 
DoH ‘ring-fenced’ funding in order to address specific hygiene issues within limited 
timescales.  DoH targets surrounding infection control have a temporary impact and help to 
focus the minds of both clinical and non-clinical management for short periods of relatively 
intense self-examination, although Boaden (2009) suggests they are not always effectively 
embedded. 
Arising from the obligation to comply with specific Department of Health demands regarding 
MRSA, and in an attempt to effectively embed improvement, the Northern Strategic Health 
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Authority (NSHA) undertook to review the specific approaches to reducing MRSA infection 
rates at the Northern Hospital (NH), which had among the highest rates of infection in the 
region.  The NSHA saw patients and the public as implementers of change, and in looking 
for a practical, systematic, long-term sustainable solution, saw ‘some form’ of social 
marketing as the best way to proceed.  Budget allocations were set aside to address service 
improvement objectives within NH, a Steering Group was set up, a broad engagement 
process scoped out, and an initial project plan developed.  As such, the remit of this project 
differed from typical improvement projects in that although its orientation was primarily within 
patient care, the initial impetus was process improvement in the public through social 
marketing techniques.  It was hoped performance improvement within the Wards would 
follow.  Despite beginning with the public, at the project’s core lay the idea of ‘sustainable 
patient value’, ensuring that the whole focus and energy of the Hospital was placed behind 
meeting the needs of the various audiences served – hospital staff, Health Management, 
patients and the wider public - so that the Hospital could be seen to have met its 
organisational quality and performance imperatives. 
The Approach Taken by the Management Consultants at Northern Hospital (NH) 
Against this backdrop the Northern Strategic Health Authority (NSHA) secured additional 
funding for social marketing support, intended to assist NH to meet its immediate objective of 
reducing MRSA infection rates.  The NSHA believed that the best possible outcomes would 
be realised using a social marketing approach, whose purpose is to achieve specific 
behavioural goals for a social good.  Its primary focus is on “benefiting the target audience 
and general society” not the marketer (Andreasen and Kotler 2003:329).  The NHSA 
believed if the behaviour and perceptions of external groups (patients and public) were 
understood, internal behaviours could be informed and developed accordingly.  This is 
perhaps a counterintuitive view of how an organisation should plan its services.  
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To this end, a specialist change management consulting firm was hired to implement best 
practice approaches to social marketing to encourage patients and the public to behave 
differently.  An initial Review Phase was the first step in the programme. 
The Review Phase 
‘Review’ was based on a preliminary assessment of the Hospital’s original proposed action 
plan.  Its focus was to assess the extent of existing knowledge of MRSA and the actions 
required to control infection rates.  A combination of data collection techniques was used.  
Partly this was to effect data triangulation, and partly because the target population varied in 
profile and accessibility.  Survey and group discussions were employed for all the internal 
and external stakeholder groups.  Internal stakeholder groups were Hospital management, 
clinical management, nursing, clinical and support staff.  External Stakeholders were the 
patients and wider public.  To strengthen generalisability the selection sample of individuals 
from a number of groupings was random:  members of ward staff, four patient groups and 
seven employee groups: 
Medical Theatre Matrons Porters 
Ward 29 Phlebotomy Renal  
Individual interviews, were conducted face-to-face or over the telephone, lasting around 45 
minutes.  The questions asked are shown in Figure 1. 
1 What do you think is the current public perception of MRSA infections? 
2 How do you think that means that patients feel when they enter hospital? 
3 What actions do you and your colleagues take at present to address these feelings? 
4 What could you do in the future to ensure patients feel more reassured about the real causes 
and likelihood of infections? 
5 What could you do in the future to reduce the causes and likelihood of MRSA infections? 
6 Where such initiatives have been tried / are in place, what stops them being adopted on an 
organisational-wide and sustainable basis? 
7 How many of these initiatives have already been tried in the past and/or are currently in place in 
some areas? 
8 How could these changes be made to work and to stick on a long-term basis? 
Figure 1:  The interview questions 
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For external stakeholders, four focus group sessions of 90 minutes each were held.  The 
same questions were asked as in the staff sessions, re-worded for relevance.  Participants 
were recruited against the following criteria: 
 Mix of males and females in each group 
 MRSA Involved Group  
 definition: 
o have had a close friend or relative involved in an MRSA ‘episode’ 
within the past 24 months 
o have visited, for any medical reason (self/other), NH within the 
past 24 months 
 Non-MRSA Group  
 definition: 
o have visited, for any medical reason (self/other), NH within the 
past 24 months 
o aware of MRSA 
All respondents within the consultation were broadly conversant with the challenges facing 
the NHS in its battle against HAI, and their profiles are shown in Figure 2. 
 MRSA involved groups Non-MRSA groups 
Wednesday 28 November 25-44, C2D 25-44, C2D 
Thursday 29 November 45+, C2D 45+, C2D 
Figure 2: Age and Socio-Economic Profile of Focus Group Respondents 
Findings from the Review Phase 
Employees showed an underlying commitment to care and awareness of the wider cultural 
and organisational issues: 
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“We’ve all lost the focus of why we’re here” (Nurse) 
“‘The focus needs to shift to good practice rather than targets” (Matron)   
 “We don’t work well as a team at an organisational level”(Nurse). 
Staff focus was strongly on quality, performance improvement and cultural change.   The 
recurring theme was the requirement for greater clarity and consistency of leadership across 
the organisation.  Accountability and silo working were raised as issues, both identified by 
Klein (2010) as areas to be addressed across the NHS.  Encouraging people to work 
together in multi-disciplinary teams toward a common patient-centred goal was identified as 
necessary –  something already practised to good effect in the Mayo Clinic (Berry 2004).   
The public surveys highlighted inconsistency of service delivery, with puzzlement that an 
organisation could get things right and ‘quite so wrong’ at the same time.  Some saw 
politicians as the root of all evil, but generally the buck came back to the Hospital’s senior 
management.  Doctors and nurses were largely exempt from being responsible for any 
professional shortcomings: 
‘It’s a shame they can’t they give proper support to the nurses and free them up to do what 
they do best, which is to care for the sick’ (Member of the public) 
‘I wouldn’t want to work in those conditions. How can they think it’s OK to carry on like this in 
the 21st century?’ (Member of the public) 
Patient and public focus was on service delivery and outcome (Groonroos’s (2007) 
functional and technical quality).  The assessment from the Review Phase indicated that 
internal issues were greater than the intended process improvements with the public.  An 
internal change programme was recognised as vital to engender performance improvement 
and cultural change to create an improvement in overall service quality.  Consequently, 
social marketing was removed from the project remit.   
9 
 
The Internal Change Programme 
Four phases, Engage, Embed, Energise and Evaluate, referred to as the ‘4Es’ were 
proposed, each with a specific thrust of activity, broadly based on ‘capturing the hearts and 
minds’ of staff (Figure 3). 
Figure 3:  The Generic Change Process (Management Consultants proprietary) 
The Engage Phase 
Key to engagement was a simple vision for change, emphasising that patients had to be 
prioritised as it was felt  that being ‘patient-led’ would enable multifunctional teams to form, 
improving staff motivation as well as outcomes.  The message (Figure 4) was communicated 
visually throughout the Ward: 
 
Figure 4:  The Vision to Engage Change 
Patient Care 
and Safety
NTHT’s Core 
Business 
Targets
Reducing 
MRSA 
Infections
Could DoShould DoMust Do
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Priorities were outlined as ‘must do’, ‘should do’ and ‘could do’, and an action plan 
developed, attempting to define the central organising principles for the Hospital to shape 
and express ‘the way things are done here’. 
The Engage Phase centred on short-term initiatives with little or no reference to the cultural 
context for attempting to change internal behaviours, grouped around the headings of 
People, Process, Practice and Performance, with the main orientation on Process and 
Performance.  To become a patient-focused organisation, the Hospital had to provide a 
consistent, organization-wide response to public and patient concerns over healthcare 
associated infections.   
The ‘patient-led’ perspective was intended to suggest a balance between the perceived 
‘value’ of clinical safety and care and the perceived ‘value’ of patient experience.  Staff were 
encouraged to work towards a common goal, to consider addressing all issues that impact 
upon the total patient experience.  The initiatives were developed under the overall umbrella 
of ‘Safe Hands’ rather than a specific change programme so that they could be embedded 
into everyday working practices.  The Chief Executive of the Hospital stated: 
‘This should not be seen as just another change initiative but core to the organisation’s 
renewed focus on patient safety.’   
The Embed and Energise Phases 
The Embed phase used the tools of lean, process improvement and change management.  
The focus was for staff to understand if not create the ‘need for change’.  Toyoda’s ‘5 Whys’ 
technique was used because it addresses single-problem events rather than broad 
organisational issues and gets to the root cause of the problem.  This is necessary when 
dealing with the MRSA issue because it directs the receiver to the desire to create a 
“Positive and Consistent Hospital Experience”, which can only be done through the 
meaningful engagement of all staff with the same message and actions working towards 
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this.  Two parallel work streams were embarked upon, emanating from the core idea of 
“creating a positive and consistent hospital experience” (Figure 5) for the Energise phase: 
 Evolutionary change: to embed sustainable, patient/customer-focused change 
across the organisation. 
 Transformational change: to make a quick and significant impact in the worst 
performing areas 
 
Figure 5:  A Balanced Response to Embedded Improvement (Management Consultants proprietary) 
 ‘Patient Safe Zones’ were created at ward level through Instant Impact Interventions initially 
focused on ‘Hot Spot’ areas.  They were based on a combination of transformational 
change, lean and kaizen principles.  Cross-functional teams were formed, facilitated by 
transformational change experts.  This phase followed the RIE format typical of Lean change 
initiatives in the NHS which provides short bursts of improvement activity over 5 days with a 
cross-section of workers involved in a particular process (Burgess 2012).   
To promote the overall ‘Safe Hands’ principle of patient safety and care, internal and 
external communications campaigns were developed.  Designed to focus on ‘creating a 
positive and consistent hospital experience’ through the 4P’s: Public/Patient, People, 
Place and Performance, these interventions echo  Glouberman and Mintzberg’s (2001:60) 
model in 4 quadrants where they discuss the four worlds of “care, cure, community and 
Evolutionary Transformational
Structural 
Marketing
Campaigning 
& 
EngagementIdea
‘PR-ability’
CORE 
IDEA
Patient Safe Zones
Trust Manifesto 
& Pledge
Safe Hands
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control”.  The intention of the 4 P’s approach was to demonstrate transparency and 
commitment of purpose, weakening the ‘curtains’ (ibid) that inhibit communication and 
collaboration. 
The ‘Safe Hands’ campaign (Figure 6), combined for NH the RIE approach, 5S and the 
consultants’ proprietary phased approach shown in Figure 3.   
 
Figure 6: The Safe Hands concept (Management Consultants proprietary) 
Of 124 ideas generated on the first ward alone, 85 were implemented.  A total of 5 Wards 
were involved. 
A single focus: creating a positive 
and consistent hospital experience
Empowering front line teams to 
improve the hospital experience for 
all
Identify opportunities to improve the 
hospital experience; generate Ideas
and Implement as many as possible, 
(including planning the 
implementation of those that take 
longer than 5 days to implement)
A balanced approach as represented 
by the 4P’s: patient/public, people, 
place and performance
Events take place over a five day 
period with ideas for improvement 
implemented in 5 days, 5 week and 5 
month periods as appropriate
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The Evaluate Phase 
The impact of ‘Safe Hands’ was measured with existing performance management data 
within the Hospital.  Hand Hygiene Audit, Hand Hygiene e-learning and MRSA e-learning 
scores improved by 24%, 44% and 60% respectively. 
The performance of all five wards in the Wing had converged at a significantly higher level.  
‘Soft’ aspects of the work were also evaluated by means of a staff questionnaire.  A 
summary of the key points is provided in Figures 7 and 8. 
 
Figure 7: Staff delight with their work area (physical environment) 
Figure 7 shows that staff in wards 33 and 34, the first two wards to complete the ‘Safe 
Hands’ process, were significantly more satisfied with their area of work. Overall, staff 
noticed change and the significant impacts achieved, demonstrated in terms of relative to 
Control Wing and over time, (compared to three months previous).  Specifically, the 
improvements related to layout, cleanliness, availability of equipment and an emerging 
sense of teamwork. 
How  satisfaction compares 
to 3 months ago
Delight = Extremely + Very Satisfied with the area in which you work
Significant 
improvements 
in both relative 
and historic 
comparisons
The Wing
Control Wing
The Wing – Doctors
The Wing – Nurses
The Wing – Other
Control Wing – Doctors
Control Wing – Nurses
Control Wing – Other
The Wing – Ward 30
The Wing – Ward 32
The Wing – Ward 33
The Wing – Ward 34
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Figure 8: Staff satisfaction with their working lives  
However, Figure 8 shows there was less willingness to tackle longer-term issues around 
culture, leadership, engagement and evolutionary change.  This may have been because of 
general resistance to change than to overall aims.  This corresponds with the lack of 
accountability identified in the findings analysis as a significant issue at NH.  It is also 
anecdotally representative of NHS culture as a whole, particularly in the hierarchies that 
exist within and between different professions, (consultants, doctors, nurses and managers), 
the evolution of which is detailed in Klein (2010).  
Greater cultural allegiance to the profession than the employer is typical of organisations 
aligned as professional bureaucracies ((Mintzberg 1983).  Yet alignment with professional 
not patient-focused mores runs counter to the idea of ‘creating a positive and consistent 
hospital experience’ in terms of its impact on consistency of service delivery. Measuring 
culture to foster change for improved quality and performance is acknowledged as being 
important (Karp 2008), yet existing tools may be inadequate, given the paucity of information 
around understanding the culture measurements.   
 “This sounds fantastic – if we could have the same – but empowering staff needs to be 
backed up by both physical and financial resource” Consultant from Control Wing 
70
75
70
41
66
46
52
61
37
15
39
35
Team spirit / morale
Level of co-operation within your team
Level of co-operation between your team and other teams
The amount of time you get to spend on the really important parts of your
job
The time you spend at work (as part of your scheduled hours)
Your overall working conditions
Beckett MartinThe Wing         Control Wing    
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 “Staff are happier at work – knock on effects to other staff and to patients” Consultant from 
The Wing 
So What? 
This project was a resounding success in the Ward.  MRSA infection rates had been 
reduced, which was the original objective.  However, this had been achieved through an 
internal change programme and not a social marketing exercise, a consequence of which 
was that there were also a number of unintended staff-related improvements, highlighted in 
Figure 8.  Morale had improved.  Traditional silo working had reduced.  The effects of 
greater co-operation were being felt by patients and shown in productivity figures the NH 
collated. 
The smallest improvement area, “Your overall working conditions” highlights in this hospital 
issues around systematic learning and consistent service delivery, identified earlier in the 
Chapter.  Given the evidence of this intervention, why did the hospital’s management not 
use this project as a pilot and implement the same changes throughout NH?  Why were the 
service outcome improvements not seen as important enough to be replicated hospital-
wide?  Further questions arise regarding the overview taken by both hospital management 
and the NSHA, such as why did neither body consider the wider results from the project and 
the potential implication for the hospital itself or the whole NSHA?  Why did they simply 
accept that MRSA infection rates had fallen to ‘acceptable’ levels and therefore consider the 
project a success, and thereby completed? 
How does the NH project compare with other NHS initiatives? 
Research on NHS performance improvement projects using Lean provides observations and 
commentary on specific situations.  Service quality and effectiveness have become 
significant priorities and have led to the naïve application of external, business sector 
managerial policies, with the tools of Lean and short-term activities as the primary focus, 
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ignoring the over-arching cultural ethos and the centrality of the customer (Currie et al. 2008, 
Klein 2010, Radnor and Osborne 2013).  Operating processes and systems have internal 
indicators of success, focused on the reporting of centrally-set targets.  Cannon (2013) 
assessed that as much as 90% of work, and improvement projects, within the NHS are 
driven by failure demand, caused by a failure or an error.  He argues systematic increase in 
demand is a function of the way the system has failure designed into it rather than inevitable.  
Cannon states the eradication of non-value-adding work is the only way to improve 
performance in the NHS.  To do this, the NHS must only do what matters to the user.  
Cannon’s exhortation epitomises the ethos of Lean.  As others have stated (Millard 2011, 
Radnor et al. 2012), success lies in patient-centred definitions of value and waste.    
Burgess (2012) evaluated Lean implementations in 143 NHS Hospitals to explore the 
context, process and content of Lean implementation by English hospital Hospitals.  The 
findings from the Case Studies are shown in Table 1.  NH has been added to this Table for 
comparison purposes. 
 Case Study 
 UHCW ELHT RBH SHK NH 
Drivers      
Performance targets and finance      
Quality      
Chief Executive      
Impact      
Small simple changes      
Focus on patient      
Learning to see      
Implementing new standards      
Challenging steps      
Reduced ‘did not attend’      
Improved morale      
Changing culture      
Improved performance      
  Table 1:  Lean Implementation – Drivers and content (Adapted from Burgess 2012:261/257) 
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Typical of Lean projects within the NHS, the NH project was also concerned with the 
organisation of work, and with the specific tasks and responsibilities therein.  As explained, 
this is core to Lean and could explain why the consultants gravitated towards using these 
tools having uncovered during the Engage phase that problems were internal and not 
something the patients and public could change.  Whilst the stated focus for the consulting 
engagement was the end-user and the public the actual driver was a response to DoH 
targets with regard to HAI.  Clearly, a reduction in infection rates improves quality.  The 15% 
year-on-year improvement resulting from the NH project is in keeping with other 
performance improvement projects where tangible outcomes are noted.  However, less 
typically, the NH project also evaluated cultural change (Figure 7) and although it identified a 
reluctance to tackle longer-term issues, it did at least highlight the need for them to be 
considered.   
In practice at NH Lean was used as a constellation of activities related to a pre-existing, 
target-led problem and not the wholesale organisational change ethos which true Lean is 
(Radnor et al. 2012).  It used the most prominent tools encountered elsewhere, such as 
RIEs, looking at micro-level improvements to raise service quality and patient experience.  
However, as stated previously, this project differed from typical change programmes 
embarked upon within NHS hospitals in that the commissioning NSHA did not identify the 
problem correctly.  It saw patients and the public as the implementers of change and for this 
reason wanted social marketing to be used to engender change in performance regarding 
MRSA in a wing of NH.  It was the management consultants, who, once engaged and 
embarked on investigating the situation in the 5 wards in the Wing, found through the 
Review phase that staff and the public saw internal issues to be more pertinent for resolution 
rather than external ones.  Staff and the public showed a greater awareness of operational 
issues than management.  Once again this highlights problems with the prevailing 
organisational culture and with accountability.  This is interesting of itself, but does prompt 
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questions about what service quality means to NHS management, and how they see their 
role in fulfilling this ‘prevailing purpose’. 
For this reason, this project was Lean by accident.  Lean was not the primary purpose.  
Instead the tools of Lean provided the most suitable mechanism for resolving the immediate 
issues, identified in the Review phase.  In typical Lean fashion, the root causes were found 
to lie elsewhere, and not in the stated identified problem.  Yes, MRSA infection rates had 
exceeded the centrally-set target and contravened centrally-driven performance measures.  
The Review phase showed that working practices had led to this, and once they were 
changed, the corollary was that MRSA infection rates reduced.  The CEO of NH announced 
on 17th January 2014 that they had achieved 135 consecutive days of an MRSA-free 
hospital, a sustainable performance improvement of note.   
So why were the cultural changes not recognised and celebrated?  Why was the link 
between the imperative of cultural change to the delivery of the clinical governance aims 
expressed in the NHS Plan firstly not acknowledged, and secondly not communicated 
throughout the organisations (locally, and the broader NHS)? 
Papadopoulos et al. (2011) have noted, use of Lean as a label for interventions in the NHS 
is widespread but the interpretation is varied.  Lean should be a cultural transformation that 
changes how an organisation works.  It requires new habits, new skills and a new attitude 
throughout the organisation in order to fulfil the underlying goal of improving value for the 
patient (Toussaint and Berry 2013).  Yet the reality appears to be that Lean follows a line of 
service improvement that brings to the fore tensions between clinicians and service leaders 
around the organisation and the delivery of healthcare work (Mazzocato et al. 2010).   It 
seems Lean principles have become entangled with other reforms and the competing voices 
of policy-makers, managers, clinical leaders and management consultants and illustrates the 
desire of policymakers to reorder clinical work thought the introduction of management 
philosophies and techniques (Waring and Bishop 2010).  This leads to question whether 
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more could be achieved within NHS hospitals if government preoccupation with centralised 
control and micro-management through targets was replaced with a template intended to 
reduce boundaries within and across organisations and organisational members, 
synchronising policy aspirations with existing power arrangements (Currie and Suhomlinova 
2006, Klein 2010). 
Would an Operations Strategy approach make a difference? 
Control is a necessary aspect of managing an organisation since it provides information and 
a starting premise for decision-making.  However, at the micro-level that hospitals have to 
respond to, it becomes a static concept.  The culture of continuous improvement, which 
emerges from a holistic Lean implementation introduces a dynamic concept into an 
organisation.  It requires choices to be made about the tools to use, in which order and in 
which emphasis (Garvin 1992).  These are surprisingly difficult decisions to make, and 
especially so without an over-arching framework within which to place thinking.  Operations 
Strategy encourages an organisation to focus on a holistic understanding of needs in order 
to fully realise potential benefits.  For a hospital, the primary need would be that of the 
patient, yet generally the policy-setter has been deemed the priority stakeholder, a situation 
which has resulted in value as specified by the public user at odds with the best use of 
resources against a backdrop of budget cuts and efficiency targets.  The environment driven 
by policy and spending reviews means the requirement to engage with process 
improvements and other concepts is driven from management, making staff management-
facing and not patient-facing, responsive to internal measures and targets and not patient 
requirements (Seddon and Caulkin 2007).  Indeed, the case outlined in this chapter 
illustrates that point exactly since the driver was a response to achieve DoH HAI targets, 
albeit the targets, being to reduce infection rates, in this case are patient-focused. 
Currently, there are a number of issues which make an already complex situation more 
difficult to unravel.  Patient value and patient needs can take on a variety of forms depending 
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on who is expressing the need – the commissioners, the clinicians, the taxpayer or the 
patient (Radnor et al. 2012).  Costs in the healthcare sector are too high and growing too 
quickly, which places pressure on government budgets and threatens the availability of 
timely care and best treatments (Graban and Swartz 2012).  The strategies for patient care 
and meeting centrally-set performance targets appear to be pointing in different directions 
and removing an integrated care ethos (Currie and Suhomlinova 2006).  
Organisations in all industries develop strategies to respond to environmental factors and 
competitive challenges such as these.  These strategies drive operational decisions.  The 
idiosyncratic nature of the environment in hospital settings suggests the need to develop 
models that are specific to this industry and which align good overall system performance 
and minimise dysfunction effects between strategy deployment and operational practice 
(Goldstein et al. 2002, Esain et al. 2008).  Good service operations management should lead 
to better or more appropriate services and experiences providing ‘triple bottom line’ benefits 
- better for patients, staff and the organisation (Johnston et al. 2012).    
To deliver better or more appropriate services, the NHS, like all service businesses needs to 
have over-arching strategies in place to try and prevent non-aligned and disjointed activities 
and decisions.  A number of approaches exist, largely discussing similar principles but 
espousing different thinking or activities as a purpose and way of developing this strategy. 
Two of these approaches are now examined and their potential usefulness to the NHS 
reflected upon.  Firstly, the Slack and Lewis Operations Strategy framework is shown in 
Figure 9. According to Slack and Lewis (2011) the application of an operations strategy 
should be central to senior managers. 
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Figure 9:  Operations Strategy framework (Slack and Lewis 2011:2) 
To understand how an organisation works, they say, the interaction between all resources 
needs to be examined.  In the context of the NHS, this framework is useful because it brings 
together the four views which encompass an organisation - operational resources, market 
requirements, operational experience and corporate strategy.  Examination of each view 
exposes the dilemmas inherent within an organisation, notably the tension between market 
requirements and the operational response possible according to resource capabilities.  Part 
of the ‘content’ of operations strategy is concerned with the organisation structure and the 
responsibility relations within the operations function.  For a hospital this encompasses the 
complexities of the power relations already discussed between commissioners, clinicians 
and managers.   
One of the problems with this framework for hospitals, or the NHS, is that it does not help 
identify what the priorities are and in what order they could be addressed.  The diagram 
appears to show that everything should be treated equally at the same time. It is not clear 
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whether it matters what we do, in what order and what the difference would be.  Yet as 
Garvin (1992) and Ritchie (2002) have both stated, it is knowing the order of priority and the 
degree of emphasis to place on it that is critical if long-term success is to be achieved.  The 
case presented confirms this, albeit through omission rather than commission.  The 
potentially far-reaching development of new working-habits and the unlearning of some old 
working practices that could help deliver sustainable, accountable, patient-focused, quality 
healthcare was overlooked in favour of recognising an immediate performance indicator 
improvement. 
The Sandcone model (Figure 10) is another way of developing an Operations Strategy.  
Unlike the Slack and Lewis approach, it provides an order for the journey of continuous 
improvement.  Ferdows and de Meyer (1990) state that excellence is built on a common set 
of fundamental principles.  The sand imagery is a stand-in for management effort and 
resources.  The sequence represents building a stable foundation which as you continue to 
pour sand you move up the path towards the development of lasting organisational 
capabilities, needing exponentially more effort and therefore a broader foundation as you 
move up through the steps.  The sequence outlined helps organisations achieve substance 
and not just form.  Cost is last not because cost improvements are an ultimate consequence 
of resources and management efforts invested in the improvement of quality, dependability 
and speed.  
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Figure 10:  The Sandcone Model (Ferdows and De Meyer 1990:175) 
The NH case appears to conform to this view in that the Ward had shown service quality 
improvements, in patient-centric and target-compliance terms, due to its clear goal of MRSA 
infection-rate reduction.  Where it falls is in the ensuing expansion and enrichment, since 
there is no evidence the gains were leveraged.  This is an important point to emphasise, 
given the literature on Lean in healthcare in the main seems to demonstrate that seeking 
‘low hanging fruit’ seems widespread while lasting cultural improvement is scant.  The NH 
case appears also to confirm that in the NHS form seems to be a more significant driver than 
substance, with the short-term goal being given more emphasis than the potential benefit of 
exponential gain through cultural changes leading to the embedding of new working 
practices. 
Speed refers to elapsed service provision time and responsiveness, which provides an 
organisation with flexibility – and thereby further enhanced performance.  For patients, 
responsiveness and elapsed time are key features of the functional quality they perceive and 
receive.  This is core to the idea of ‘sustainable patient value’, as espoused by NH 
management, yet the core pursuit was conformance to centrally-set targets. 
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Improvements obtained in this way are more stable and likely to be more sustainable 
because they emerged as a result of the deeper penetration of good management practices.  
This is difficult at the best of times and tantamount to impossible if management effort and 
resources are focused on fulfilling a frequently-changing government agenda rather than on 
developing lasting organisational capabilities.  If ‘low hanging fruit’ in the form of the meeting 
of centrally-set targets is the constant goal, then the more lasting operational successes 
achievable through holistic, organisational continuous improvement as advocated by the 
Sandcone concept will always remain a chimera. 
The advantage of this model seems to be that it encourages the development and nurturing 
of organisational capabilities cumulatively, which appears to imply they will be more deeply 
ingrained and therefore longer lasting.  Through its cumulative principles it takes into 
account the trade-off concept, suggesting the specific pattern of capability enhancement 
incorporates relevant trade-offs as the organisation moves up the pyramid. 
Conclusion 
The main contribution of this chapter is the consideration that an Operations Strategy 
developed specifically for Healthcare could lead to a holistic continuous improvement ethos.  
Lean addresses whole organisational issues, but its application in Healthcare precludes this.   
The tools of Lean when used in isolation tend to address single-problem events and ignore 
the centrality of the customer.  It was the centrality of the customer to a single-issue event 
which drove NH and NSHA management to engage consultants.  The over-riding theme 
from staff was the requirement for greater clarity and consistency of leadership across the 
organisation.  External stakeholder concerns were about inconsistency of service quality and 
delivery.  This combination emphasises the ‘patient-led’ perspective, and the need for 
multifunctional teams, balancing patient experience with clinical safety and providing a 
common organisational goal.  At NH, embedding changes into everyday working practices 
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appears to have diluted organisation-wide action, resulting in keeping the changes isolated 
within one Ward.   
In line with an estimated 90% of work within the NHS (Cannon, 2013), the NH consulting 
intervention was driven by failure-demand – the non-achievement of MRSA targets.  This 
implies implying management emphasis on target-fulfilment, showing an internal, not 
customer, focus.  As Radnor et al. (2012), Millard (2011) and Cannon (2013) state, success 
lies in patient-centred understanding of delivery and waste.  Adopting an Organisation 
Strategy approach, like adopting Lean, means changing how an organisation works.  An 
Operations Strategy tries to prevent non-aligned, disjointed activities and decisions whilst 
allowing for local variations.  It means developing new habits, skills and attitudes to reduce 
boundaries within and across organisations and organisational members, as happened in 
the Ward at NH.  Organising to deliver that is what an operations strategy can help achieve.   
Service quality in a hospital is not just about reaching targets set by a central government 
department; it is about ensuring that the patient experience is consistent throughout a stay 
whilst nevertheless delivering a successful clinical outcome.  This is probably achieved in the 
main throughout the NHS but the creation of an Operations Strategy would demonstrate a 
tangible audit trail from inception to implementation, showing patient value to all its 
stakeholders. 
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